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Abstract 
This article introduces a new, performative framework for analysing intellectuals and 
intellectual interventions. It elaborates on the strengths of this theoretical perspective 
vis-a`-vis rival approaches and develops this frame of reference by exploring key 
constituent concepts, including positioning, script and staging. The article then exem- 
plifies the framework and demonstrates its applicability by exploring a public intellectual 
performance by Jean-Paul Sartre. To conclude, the article reflects on recent shifts in 
public intellectual performances, especially changes that are relatively durable and 
connected to the rise of new media. 
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This article puts forward a performative framework for analysing intellectual interven- 
tions. We will explain the broad rationale behind this dramaturgical approach and show 
what its advantages are in relation to rival approaches. This will enable us to present the 
main outline of this theoretical perspective and introduce its core concepts. We will also 
explain the import of the framework for assisting in the analysis of mechanisms of 
reception, appreciation and rejection of intellectual products. We then provide a brief 
analysis of a public intellectual performance by Jean-Paul Sartre. Towards the end of the 
article, we will show how this theoretical outline can illuminate recent shifts in the nature 
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of public intellectual engagement, especially in Europe and North America. We focus in 
particular on two types of changes at the level of performativity: we note how intellec- 
tuals increasingly build a self-conscious awareness of performance into their perfor- 
mances themselves, and we comment on changes that are visibly connected to the 
arrival of new social media. It is our contention that these recent technological changes 
have substantially altered the public intellectual realm, though not always in a straight- 
forward or linear fashion. 
While the article takes as its starting point the relevance of positioning theory for the 
study of intellectuals (see also Baert, 2015: 158–89), its focus will be on how this 
positioning theory can be enriched with the help of the dramaturgical approach. By the 
latter, we refer to a theoretical orientation that attempts to account for intellectual life 
through the notion of performance in two primary ways. First, in a weaker sense, we 
draw upon illuminating analogies with the stage and related metaphors; and, second, in 
the stronger sense, we acknowledge and examine the actual performance present within 
social action. For the sake of clarity, it is worth pointing out that we are using the term 
‘intellectual intervention’ broadly, referring to any contribution (a talk, a book, an 
article, a blog or any section thereof) that is seen to be engaging with issues of ideational 
significance. By positioning theory, we refer to a theoretical approach that conceives of 
intellectual interventions as attributing features to their authors and to others – locating 
them within the intellectual and political field. 
It will become clear throughout this article that the performative perspective that we 
propose is also eminently applicable to the study of the internal world of academia (e.g. 
Morgan and Baert, 2015) and some of our examples will be derived from that realm. 
We will, however, broaden our focus here to account also for interventions made by 
public intellectuals. By public intellectuals, we refer to intellectuals, who, while pos- 
sibly drawing on their expertise in a specific area, address a broader public and engage 
with what are considered to be significant social and political issues of the day which 
go well beyond their narrow field of professional focus. We are conscious of the fact 
that the distinction between ‘intellectual’ and ‘public intellectual’ is not always clear- 
cut and that at some level any intellectual activity implies an engagement with a public 
(Collini, 2006). Indeed, etymologically speaking, the term ‘intellectual’ has connota- 
tions of publicness: it was initially coined to refer to supporters of Alfred Dreyfus, who 
drew upon their intellectual authority to speak out publicly in defence of the Jewish 
army officer against accusations of treason (Charles, 2015). Nevertheless, there  is 
currency in holding on to the conceptual differentiation between ‘intellectual’ and 
‘public intellectual’, with ‘public’ referring to an engagement clearly beyond specia- 
lized circles and the academic realm. Without this distinction, it would be difficult to 
appreciate the uniqueness of intellectual interventions in the public realm, especially in 
relation to the role of new media. 
With this performative framework, we intend to distance ourselves from two domi- 
nant assumptions that are shared by various theoretical and methodological perspectives 
in the sociology of intellectuals (and, to a certain extent, in intellectual history). The first 
assumption we wish to question is the idea that the sociological study of intellectuals 
should focus mainly, if not exclusively, on the structural factors that explain why certain 
ideas or interventions came into being. There are two main strands in this approach. 
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Some sociologists focus on factors internal to the milieus in which intellectuals operate; 
take, for instance, Bourdieu’s exploration of the internal dynamics of elite academic 
institutions in France (e.g. Bourdieu, 1998). Others analyse structural conditions that are 
external to these milieus; traditionally Marxist-inspired approaches tried to show why 
the class affiliations of an intellectual (or, possibly more crudely, a particular mode of 
production in operation at the time) were linked to the ideas of different groups (e.g. 
Lefebvre, 1946; Gramsci, 1971 [1929–1935]). Whatever their differences, both strands 
share the presupposition that the primary task of the sociologist is to uncover the deeper 
structural dynamics at work that affect the shape of intellectual production. Both strands 
have proven to be productive research programmes, demonstrating that intellectual 
activities do not take place in a social vacuum, but their weakness lies in the way in 
which they tacitly or explicitly underplay intellectuals’ agency. The intellectuals and 
their products tend to be portrayed as recipients of social forces and there is too little 
exploration of the myriad performative and strategic devices which intellectuals employ 
to get their message across. Further, in this type of work, insufficient attention is given to 
how and why certain intellectual products ‘catch on’ and others do not – how certain 
ideas are taken up, adopted and possibly altered in the process. 
The second presupposition we wish to question concerns intentionality. Without 
wishing to engage directly in the ongoing theoretical debate, initiated by Mills (1940) 
over the place of motives in sociology, our performative perspective does challenge the 
methodological assumption that sociological research (or indeed intellectual history) is 
easily or automatically able to reconstruct the intentions or motives behind certain 
intellectual interventions. Sometimes a social analyst can, with justification, impute a 
motive behind social action; other times one cannot. To decide in which instance one can 
(or cannot) should always be on the basis of the empirical material available. 
Relatedly, social research occasionally attempts to uncover a theme, principle or 
outlook that supposedly runs throughout the trajectory of the intellectual who is being 
discussed, arguably providing an in-depth explanation as to their specific intentions or 
motives on any occasion. This methodological perspective can often be found in bio- 
graphies of major intellectual figures, and the reason for this might be relatively straight- 
forward: being able to attribute intentions to writings or speeches brings to life and gives 
intuitive sense to what is otherwise at risk of becoming a dry narrative – simply a 
succession of facts. Relying upon the idea that a particular worldview or a relatively 
constant self-concept guides the intellectual provides coherence to any such biography. 
Neil Gross’s (2009) sociologically-inspired biography of the American philosopher 
Richard Rorty provides a good example of this approach. Gross argues that Rorty’s 
parental background accounts for his self-concept as a progressive pragmatist intellec- 
tual and that it was this theme of a left-leaning Deweyan that ran throughout Rorty’s 
intellectual trajectory. While there is no doubt that this methodological strategy has led 
to successful accounts of the intellectual trajectory of individual figures, these storylines, 
centred as they are around intentions and themes, tend to be beset by two problems. First, 
it is often difficult to find conclusive empirical evidence for making claims about the 
motives and intentions of individuals, and therefore the narratives presented within this 
methodological perspective tend to be speculative in nature. Second, this perspective 
sometimes overstates the coherence within an intellectual’s trajectory, overlooking the 
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changes in positions that often occur, and the possible structural causes of these altera- 
tions, something Rorty (1989) himself in fact captured with his term ‘contingency’. This 
issue is evident in Gross’s otherwise compelling biography: in spite of Rorty’s sympa- 
thies for Dewey’s pragmatism, he seemed to set those interests aside for more than two 
decades, operating comfortably within the contours of the analytic philosophy dominant 
at the time. Only when he had managed to obtain secure tenure and then a senior position 
did Rorty revisit his pragmatist roots and rebel against the reigning orthodoxy of the day. 
This case demonstrates the extent to which intellectuals regularly shift positions and 
sometimes do so in response to constraints and incentives. 
 
Theoretical outline 
Applied to intellectuals, the dramaturgical approach we are outlining accounts for their 
activities in two principal ways. First, in the tradition of theatrum mundi, it makes sense 
of intellectual activities by drawing on illuminating analogies and metaphors related to 
the theatre. Underlying this perspective is the contention that analogies are central to 
explaining social phenomena (Collins, 1976), and that similarities (and mutatis mutandis 
dissimilarities) with the stage are helpful in understanding certain distinctive features of 
intellectual life. Second, building upon a rich tradition in philosophy and the social 
sciences (e.g. Austin, 1957; Goffman, 1959; Turner, 1968, 1974; Schechner, 1977; 
Geertz, 1980; Butler, 1997; Alexander, 2004, 2016), we analyse social drama not only 
as analogous to performance, but in fact as performance proper itself. In other words, we 
argue that social performance frequently contains many, and sometimes all, of the 
characteristic hallmarks (actors, audiences, stages, rehearsal, symbolic communication, 
improvisation, direction, etc.) of more formalized modes of performance. We therefore 
understand stage or screen dramas as distinct from social dramas more in terms of 
degrees of control over formalization, framing, and focus – that is, in terms of differences 
in intensity rather than type. 
While we find great inspiration from many of these other approaches to social per- 
formance, we find limitations in them too. In much of the anthropological literature, for 
instance, performance has been too strongly associated with bounded forms of ritual and 
ceremony. While ritual events no doubt bring performance to the fore, as indeed we 
acknowledge in what follows, such an approach has a tendency to divert analytical 
attention away from other, perhaps more banal, instances of performance, and so miss 
the ubiquity of the phenomenon. Micro-sociologists brilliantly opened up the centrality 
of performance in face-to-face interactions, providing an innovative view of the social as 
constructed from the impression management built up over countless self-presentations, 
but too often this account has rested upon psychological assumptions of instrumental 
intent, and without adequately linking the micro to the broader, shared and socially- 
structured powers that enable or constrain those performances. Performance Studies 
theorists have advanced the field enormously by bringing to bear their expertise in stage 
drama, but have sometimes lacked a sense of the uniqueness of the social field in itself. 
American cultural sociology has successfully addressed many of the limitations of 
these former approaches and, at least more recently, reinstated the importance of power 
that was perhaps lacking in their own earlier contributions. They have also applied their 
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perspective to a huge variety of empirical settings, illustrating the methodological cen- 
trality of cultural performance. While we again draw much from this work and find 
cultural sociological schemas to be useful heuristics,1 we also find that they can become 
limiting once an assumption of a priori elements of performance is allowed to constrain 
a more promiscuous and unconstrained reading of the empirical free-flow of dramatic 
social action, and in particular the inextricable link between the cultural and material 
realms. As will become apparent near the end of this article, much of the new cultural 
sociological approach is also built on an inexplicit assumption of a particular traditional 
and generic genre of social performance which, at least in the intellectual realm, is 
showing some signs of breaking down. 
Crucial to our own dramaturgical approach are the notions of performativity and 
positioning. Intellectual interventions can be seen as performative in that they bring 
something into being – they do something. One of the basic principles underlying this 
approach is that any intellectual intervention, even a purely scholarly one, has effects, 
however minute they may be. While focusing upon the symbolic representation inherent 
in performances has proven productive, it can also be fruitful to analyse intellectual 
interventions in terms of their observable consequences. In the case of public intellec- 
tuals, for instance, the overtly political nature of many interventions initiated by such 
intellectuals means that their effects upon the public realm can be empirically traced and 
reconstructed. 
We regard the notion of positioning as a central feature of performativity. Positioning 
refers to the process by which individuals ascribe certain characteristics to themselves 
and to others. Indeed, we regard intellectual interventions as bringing about positioning: 
through their writings and speeches intellectuals wittingly or unwittingly attribute var- 
ious features to the authors and to others (see also Baert, 2015). These characteristics are 
often put in terms of dichotomies such as ‘left vs. right’, ‘high-brow vs. low-brow’, 
‘white vs. black’, etc. (cf. Le´vi-Strauss, 1969). Another way of putting this is to suggest 
that intellectual interventions always locate the authors within the specific cultural 
architecture of the time, while also situating others. Indeed, in accordance with structur- 
alist insights, self-positioning (the attribution of features to oneself) is often made pos- 
sible through the positioning of others, either by showing affinities with them or through 
juxtaposition (again, using dichotomies). It was,  for  instance,  through  contrast  with 
social contract theorists that Durkheim was able to locate one of the central themes of 
his own sociological approach (Durkheim, 1997 [1893]), just as within the context of 
post-1945 Britain, Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich von Hayek, and Karl Popper positioned them- 
selves within a liberal tradition through their critical readings of Marx and Marxism 
(Berlin, 1967; Popper, 1971 [1945a], 2002 [1957] 2013 [1945b]; Hayek, 2001 [1944]). 
Actors engaging in positioning and self-positioning draw on various dramaturgical 
devices; they range from stage-setting and genre conformity to rhetorical moves in how 
arguments are presented. We will return to these dramaturgical devices below. It is 
important, at this stage, to emphasize that positioning is rarely an individual endeavour. 
First, as in other modes of social performance (Goffman, 1959), intellectuals often 
organize themselves into teams, since such team work is particularly effective for 
achieving the kinds of ends that positioning often tends towards. The Frankfurt School, 
the Bloomsbury group or the Tel Quel circle are examples of intellectual teams: their 
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connections helping them to bring about collective positioning, while simultaneously 
allowing for individual differences. These three teams relied upon strong, intimate 
relationships and such strong bonds often make for effective networks (see also Collins, 
2000), though many intellectual teams today operate without ongoing face-to-face inter- 
actions, let alone strong, affective ties. Second, intellectuals always form part of broader 
networks, which go well beyond the boundaries of their immediate team. These may well 
include opponents and critics and, in accordance with insights from social network 
analysis (Granovetter, 1973), these broader networks help them organize intellectual 
activity, as well as ultimately define who they are. However carefully intellectuals aim 
to locate themselves – and as we have mentioned, positing intentionality can on occasion 
be justified – the process of positioning is never entirely within their control, as other 
intellectuals will influence how their own positioning plays itself out. 
This indeterminate element also means that, through time, someone’s positioning can 
shift substantially, even if he or she does not necessarily intend to bring this about. 
Posthumous repositioning is well documented: certain intellectuals and their inventions 
may suddenly be seen in a new light. They may also gradually be forgotten or redis- 
covered. There are many recent examples of this posthumous repositioning: take, for 
instance, Bruno Latour’s attempts at reviving Tarde and demoting Durkheim’s canonical 
position (Latour, 2001); progressive intellectuals such as Chantal Mouffe and Giorgio 
Agamben who ‘re-discovered’ Carl Schmitt; or, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, 
previously laissez-faire economists, such as Richard Posner, who started to re-appreciate 
Keynes’s insights (Posner, 2009). Other examples include the reassessment of Paul De 
Man’s writings following the discovery of his anti-Semitic wartime journalism, the 
challenge mounted by Derek Freeman (1983) to Margaret Mead’s ethnographic work 
in Samoa, or the shift in reception of Malinowski’s work following his widow’s con- 
troversial decision to publish his diaries from New Guinea and the Trobriand Islands 
(Malinowski, 1967). This last example is a classic case of how repositioning can be 
provoked through the unanticipated exposure of an audience to the backstage (more of 
which below), after having previously only been granted access to the front stage of a 
performance.2 
Performativity and positioning imply an actor and an audience. The actor refers to any 
individual or group of individuals who is responsible for initiating the intellectual inter- 
vention, whereas the audience acts as the recipient. The actors normally have some idea 
of the nature of their audience, which enables them to put themselves in the perspective 
of the audience to ensure their message gets across. This is more likely to be the case 
when addressing small groups of carefully selected, and perhaps like-minded, individ- 
uals. In Ancient Greece, for instance, Plato was particularly concerned with 
choosing his audience to ensure that his message would not go astray (Booth, 2015). 
Beyond small circles, however, it is impossible to keep com- munication cut off from 
hermeneutic indeterminacy. Take the simple case of a lecture: as with theatre, actors will 
have some understanding of whom they are addressing, but they are unlikely to know 
every member of the audience. Also, the lecture might be recorded, which would add 
further uncertainty as to the extended audience. This relative indeter- minacy also 
applies to the printed text: although authors normally have a particular audience in 
mind, once the text has been published, they inevitably lose control over 
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who reads it, the reasons people may have for reading it, and of course how the text will 
be understood. In general, while actors may have particular views as to what their 
intellectual interventions are meant to convey, these do not necessarily correspond to 
interpretations by the audience. Encoding and decoding do not always correspond. This 
has of course always been the case, but there are compelling reasons to believe that 
indeterminate interpretation has increased over time: not only have audiences multiplied 
in number and become progressively more heterogeneous, but the growth of new media 
has also been characterized by the proliferation of edited, cut-up, deracinated, de- 
contextualized, and re-contextualized messages. 
As we know, any theatrical performance is set upon a stage. As such, the stage both 
empowers and restricts the performance: it provides a setting against which the perfor- 
mance makes sense, but it also imposes a certain meaning on to it, closing off others. In a 
similar fashion, intellectual interventions take place within a particular setting which 
enables, constrains, and helps attribute meaning  to them.  Historically, major religions 
provided a ‘sacred’ platform for prophets or priests (Weber, 1920, 1978), but the advent 
of the Enlightenment weakened the link between religion and intellectualism,  and, at 
least in the West, the staging of intellectual interventions have tended to become more 
secular. This formal secularism must not, however, be mistaken for the evacuation of the 
sacred from social performance. Literary salons emerged during this period, providing 
an impressive stage, not only for the exhibition of good manners and taste, but also for 
the transmission of intellectual ideas. The importance of the host, such as Isabella d’Este, 
the grandeur of the de´cor, and the high-society connections helped to provide legitimacy 
to such occasions and indeed sacralize the  ensuing  intellectual  exchanges  (Craveri, 
2007). The creation of the bourgeois public sphere in the course of the nineteenth century 
weakened the centrality of patronage to the intellectual  sphere,  but  it  continued  the 
further dissociation between the religious and the public  intellectual  realms  (Sennett, 
1977; Habermas, 1992).  Up to the present day, the  identity of the host  nevertheless 
remains an important element in legitimizing or delegitimizing performances, whether 
it is in the form of an individual introducing a speech or acting as editor of a publication 
or, impersonally, in the form of an institution providing a venue or organizational link. 
With the rise of the mass media, specific outlets also present an effective stage, with 
famous talk shows like Apostrophes, hosted by Bernard Pivot on French television from 
the 1970s to the early 1990s, providing attractive opportunities for intellectuals to reach 
out to their prospective audiences. 
Staging remains a central element of intellectual work today. Take, for example, the 
ritual of inaugural lectures given by newly appointed Chairs at academic institutions. 
Unlike an ordinary lecture, an inaugural lecture is open to the public, it tends to take 
place in grand surroundings with local luminaries present, and it is often introduced by 
senior figures of the university who are appropriately dressed for the occasion – possibly 
even in gowns and hoods. The whole setting and its pomp convey the significance of the 
occasion; and indeed the new incumbent is supposed to make his or her intellectual 
claim, presenting a bold, new outlook, which justifies his or her appointment. The book 
launch provides another ritual in which the setting plays a significant role. In comparison 
with inaugural lectures, book launches are ostensibly a more casual affair, but they are 
nevertheless highly ritualized. The likelihood that the book will be well received is aided 
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by its being launched in venues with historic and symbolic significance (a venerable 
institution like a national academy or a well-established bookshop), and again, especially 
so if the author is introduced by other respected intellectual figures. Even the eminence 
of the invitees helps indicate the importance of the occasion, and by association, so too 
the book. Here, again, the stage helps to consecrate, and a particular script – a sequence 
of events – is normally expected to be followed. 
A stage, as we define it, is a sub-class of a broader device, a frame (e.g. Goffman, 
1974), which can itself be described as any setting – physical or conceptual – within 
which an  intellectual intervention  takes place  and which helps, on the  one  hand, to 
impose meanings upon the intervention, and, on the other, to close off certain interpreta- 
tions. We have already touched on this issue of framing, which is an essential component 
of intellectual life, and by which intellectual interventions are given shape and direction, 
helping the audience evaluate and make sense of them. There are plenty of examples in 
the intellectual and academic realms. In relation to books, their titles, the reputation of 
the publisher, or their inclusion in a specific series, all help to set the scene. So too do the 
author biography and cover blurbs. A publisher’s catalogue provides additional framing, 
signalling significance, niche, and genre to prospective readers. Academic journals like- 
wise offer frames for their articles: the journal’s reputation, its publisher, editorial board, 
general intellectual orientation, and now its ‘impact factor’. Sequencing might also be 
crucial as might the length of time or space set aside for a particular intervention: leading 
articles in special issues, or keynote or plenary lectures suggest relative importance and 
sacralization. 
The above should not give the impression that staging is solely in the hands of the 
author or that it is carefully manipulated by him or her. Social life is conducted in open 
systems and therefore, as we mentioned above, systematic contingency comes into play. 
Sometimes the stage is only partially given – a setting against which the author performs 
and which, in subsequent readings, happens to attribute particular meaning to his or her 
writings or speeches. This was to a certain extent the case, for instance, for Rupert 
Brooke’s war poems. While some of these poems undoubtedly dealt with the battlefield 
experience, and have a patriotic ring to them, subsequent British audiences have defined 
Brooke’s legacy virtually exclusively in light of the First World War, focusing on his 
perceived nationalism and heroism (see, for instance, Rutherford, 1997). The First World 
War then acted as a stage against which his poetry was read and his figure remembered, 
attributing intensity and emotive qualities to his work. Brooke became a Romantic hero, 
with his beauty and that of his poetry contrasted with the horror of conflict. This example 
demonstrates how the historical context in which intellectuals write often provides a 
stage which helps imbue their performance with particular meanings, but only insofar as 
the audience sees the performance as alluding to this context. This is precisely where the 
broader network of commentators and critics, agents and interpreters play a central role 
in the making of an intellectual, forming the stage and thereby collectively shaping his or 
her positioning. 
The stage also creates an aura surrounding the actor and his or her intellectual inter- 
ventions. By aura, we refer to the process by which physical and mental distance is 
created between the actor and the audience, in some cases, generating audience rever- 
ence for the actor.3  In the case of a lecture, the distance between the actor and the 
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audience is physcial in that the actor and the audience are spatially separated and the 
former may speak from a pedestal or platform. The distance, however, is also concep- 
tual: the stage suggests that the actor operates in a different, set-apart, more sacred realm 
in comparison to the audience. Props and devices help establish this sense of otherness: 
historically, universities expected their lecturers to wear gowns while lecturing. Beyond 
the academy, the use of media such as radio or television often accentuates this process 
of distancing, otherworldliness, and potential reverence. 
From what we have said so far, it should be clear that the notion of a stage implies the 
distinction between a backstage and a front stage (Goffman, 1959). We understand this 
differentiation as important for creating and maintaining a sense of aura, and define back- 
stage not just spatially, but also in temporal terms. A backstage, as we use it here, refers to 
any time or  space  within which  intellectuals  prepare the performance away  from the 
public, or to which they retreat following a public performance. A public intellectual’s 
appearance on radio and  television,  for instance,  is often preceded by a rehearsal  or 
briefing about the content of the discussion to ensure the programme runs smoothly. A 
lecture or talk likewise relies on dedicating time to preparation, and publishing normally 
takes place after the writing of drafts, the incorporation of referees’ comments and careful 
editing work – all these activities count as backstage, during which various people (the 
writer, referees, editors, and so on) reshape the initial product in accordance with specific 
norms and expectations, distributing agency and complicating straightforward notions of 
authorship even before post-structuralist considerations (e.g. Barthes, 1978 [1967]) have 
been brought into play. More generally, the backstage enables intellectuals to think ahead, 
or reflect back, consider the possible or actual reactions of an audience to alternative ways 
of expressing themselves. The backstage, therefore, enables conscious positioning, for 
thinking through the consequences of particular ways of presenting oneself. 
Among the dramaturgical devices that intellectuals employ, rhetoric is particularly 
important. As Aristotle pointed out, the art of rhetoric relies on three ‘means of persua- 
sion’. Persuasion can take place through logical argumentation (logos); through convey- 
ing, or relying upon, a desirable character trait, such as trustworthiness, for grounding the 
authority of one’s message (e¯thos); and through evoking appropriate emotions in one’s 
audience (pathos) (Aristotle, 1991). Building on Aristotle’s typology, it is clear that the 
intellectual sphere brings something unique to all three dimensions. 
Logos is meant to be the centrepiece of the intellectual sphere, leading sometimes to 
meta-theoretical discussions about what counts as superior or fallacious argumentation. 
Therefore,  the  intellectual  sphere  often  tends  to  counterpose  rhetorical  devices  and 
statements of truth, condemning the former and celebrating the latter, as was famously 
the case in Plato’s treatment of Gorgias (Plato, 1979). Sometimes, however, meta- 
theoretical arguments are put forward to blur the distinction between the two. Indeed 
neo-pragmatism and some forms of post-structuralist theory have questioned the possi- 
bility of atemporal foundations on which to ground knowledge (e.g. Rorty, 1979, 1982). 
In relation to e¯thos, the intellectual world is also distinctive: in addition to trustworthi- 
ness and fair-mindedness, it is important for writers or speakers to exude a sense of gravitas 
or  learnedness.  Indeed,  in  the  intellectual  realm,  these  attributes  are  often  interlinked: 
learnedness  is  seen  as  a  precondition  for  trustworthiness.  This  explains,  for  instance, 
introductory blurbs listing one’s achievements in order to assign credibility and thus instil 
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trust. In the humanities, the credibility of an intellectual also depends on the form through 
which their arguments are presented, as well as the references they choose to elaborate 
their case; they show the author and his or her arguments to be steeped in a broader 
tradition, allowing the possibility of greater weight and reach. 
In relation to pathos, intellectuals also often draw upon powerful metaphors to make an 
inroad, and the courtroom, for instance, is a deeply ingrained image frequently invoked by 
intellectuals.4 Disputes are then portrayed as analogous to legal cases, with the intellectual 
assuming the role of the prosecutor and their opponent(s) that of the accused. The audience 
are then implicitly cast as the presiding judge. Metaphors and analogies of this kind capture 
attention and provide intensity, creating a sense of drama and suspense. These rhetorical 
moves, however, do not emerge ex nihilo. They are most likely to be effective when 
drawing on a set of implicit, shared assumptions, or what Durkheim called ‘collective 
representations’ (2001 [1912]), which resonate with the audience, often by mapping onto 
neat, recognizable dichotomies. Indeed, as in other areas of cultural life (Le´vi-Strauss, 
1969), intellectuals frequently rely upon shared oppositions, for instance, between mod- 
ernity and post-modernity, between subject-centred and object-oriented philosophy, 
between society and the individual, between the state and the market, and so on, in order 
to successfully engage their audiences. 
Rhetorical devices refer to both the past and the future. Again drawing loosely on 
Aristotle’s treatment of the art of rhetoric, we can distinguish between deliberative, 
judicial, and epideictic interventions. Deliberative speeches or writings are directed to 
the future; they aim to encourage certain actions while dissuading others. This is often 
done by exploring the likely outcomes of various courses of action. Whereas deliberative 
interventions weigh up possible futures, judicial interventions refer to the past. They are 
meant to comment positively or negatively on what happened, condemning or praising 
decisions or actions that have already taken place. In Aristotle’s terminology, epideictic 
interventions do not necessarily refer to either the past or the future but are meant to 
praise the moral strength of an individual or condemn the lack of it. In practice, however, 
the three types of interventions are often interlinked and it is difficult to conceive of 
epideictic interventions that do not include references to the past or future. Sociological 
research on the role of intellectuals as carriers of trauma has shown how often the 
condemnation or praise of individuals ties in with intricate arguments about their alleged 
responsibility in relation to traumatic events in the past, while those accounts of the past 
often provide a sense of how to move forward collectively (e.g. Eyerman, 2002, 2011). 
In some cases, the general demeanour, appearance, or idiosyncratic behaviour of 
intellectuals helps situate them within the artistic, intellectual or political arenas. In the 
minds of many, Immanuel Kant’s rigid lifestyle, divided up into perfectly timed habitual 
acts, fitted the rigour of his rationalist philosophy, just as Martin Heidegger’s vo¨lkisch 
appearance and mode of living came to be seen as matching the anti-modernist tenden- 
cies of his philosophy (and later, his Nazi affiliations too). In a similar fashion, Dylan 
Thomas’s drunken outbursts and wild lifestyle were subsequently portrayed as a fitting 
accompaniment to his remarkable talent as a poet – a view popularized by John Malcolm 
Brinnin’s (1957) highly influential portrait. 
Sometimes, however, these behavioural attributes are more than just complements of 
intellectual stances or ways in which intellectuals are remembered; they can actually be 
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constitutive of the intellectual positioning, and without  which  the  positioning  itself 
would be put at risk. Oscar Wilde’s flamboyant demeanor and camp appearance came 
to be recognised as part and parcel of his carefree, witty aestheticism; the former 
instantiated and embodied the latter. Likewise, Sartre and de Beauvoir’s bohemian life- 
style, their refusal to marry and their open relationship came to ‘perform’ their existen- 
tialist philosophy and their drive towards authenticity, just as they enacted their stance of 
the ‘engaged intellectual’ through their various political involvements. Similarly, Hirsi 
Ali’s self-assured and eloquent appearances on Dutch television at the beginning of this 
century were not only central to her rise as a celebrity figure in the Netherlands, but, as 
some observers noted, also came to embody and typify her secular, feminist stance 
(Heynders, 2016: 109–12). In the same vein, Steve Biko’s confident demeanour and 
capacity for highly articulate public speech, did not just fit Black Consciousness as a 
political philosophy; it was one of the visible ways in which the need for blacks to shed 
ingrained  inferiority  complexes  was  performed. 
 
 
Sartre as a dramatic public intellectual 
So far we have provided examples covering a broad range of intellectual interventions, 
we will now focus on the phenomenon of public intellectualism, exemplified through a 
dramatic performance by perhaps the very archetype of a public intellectual: Jean-Paul 
Sartre. 
In the Anglo-Saxon secondary literature on Sartre, the French philosopher is often 
remembered for his political interventions in the 1950s and  1960s,  for  instance,  in 
relation to the Cold War, Algeria, Vietnam, and so on. Until the mid-1940s, however, 
Sartre’s political awareness was very limited and so was his political involvement. It is 
around the mid-1940s that Sartre reinvented himself as an ‘engaged intellectual’, who 
saw it as his duty to speak out and commit to political action. Sartre argued that the 
experience of the Second World War had changed him and he had come to realize how 
important it was to act politically, using a variety of media – plays, novels, journalism, 
interviews and lectures – to reposition himself in accordance with his new persona. We 
shall focus here on one of those public lectures, entitled ‘L’Existentialisme est un 
humanisme’, which he gave on 29 October 1945 in Paris. 
By the time of the lecture, Paris had been liberated for over a year and Germany had 
surrendered in the Second World War. Sartre had started to establish himself as a major 
public intellectual, writing for various newspapers and magazines. Within the media, 
there was a growing interest in the philosophy of existentialism associated with his and 
others’ work. De Beauvoir retrospectively referred to the autumn of 1945 as the ‘exis- 
tentialist offensive’ because it was during this period that the French intelligentsia and, to 
a certain extent, the media in general became captivated by existentialist philosophy. 
Besides some key novels and plays by both Sartre and de Beauvoir during this period, 
they also launched the journal Les Temps modernes on 1 October 1945, providing a 
powerful platform for the exercise of committed intellectualism. Sartre had already 
become an important figure on the literary and political scene and he had become the 
target of criticism from both Catholics and members of the Communist Party. The 
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former considered his philosophy nihilistic; the latter portrayed it as individualistic and 
bourgeois (Baert, 2015: 91–112). 
It was against this background that Sartre gave his famous lecture on existentialism. 
Like theatre, lectures are marked out by the co-presence of speaker and audience and the 
immediacy of the occasion. Sartre’s lecture took place at the Maison des Centraux in 
Paris and it was organized by the Club Maintenant, a cultural organization at the time 
without any distinct political orientation. The organizers were Marc Beigbeder and 
Jacques Calmy, who would later establish himself as a Sartre expert. The venue was 
an intimate lecture theatre, providing the ideal stage for Sartre’s carefully orchestrated 
performance. The lecture was advertised all across Paris and also in many newspapers, 
including Le Monde, Combat, Le Figaro and Libe´ration. The organizers invited key 
journalists who subsequently reported on the event. The advertising was so effective that 
four hundred people turned up; the lecture hall was immensely crowded, surprising even 
the speaker himself (Cohen-Solal, 2005: 247–69). 
Sartre’s performance was impeccable. He spoke eloquently and without notes, 
explained clearly and succinctly what existentialism stood for, and defended it against 
criticisms from both Catholic and Communist quarters. Sartre had previously used the 
concept of ‘philosophy of existence’, but he now embraced the widely used term ‘exis- 
tentialism’. Keen to show a clean break with the nihilism of his pre-war writings, Sartre 
also made the link with ‘humanism’ central to his talk. Existentialism, in this account, 
was anything but a philosophy of despair, or an individual-centred credo; it was inter- 
twined with the condition of humanity itself. This focus enabled Sartre’s message to 
resonate well with a primed audience, for whom ‘humanism’ was already a recognizable 
and unifying label (Baring, 2010). 
During this period, Sartre redefined his philosophy around the notion of responsibil- 
ity. There is no essence or God, Sartre explained in the lecture, so people are genuinely 
free, but with this freedom comes enormous responsibility. In so doing, Sartre was 
clearly tapping into the cultural sensitivities of the time: the notion of responsibility 
loomed large in the prosecution of wartime collaborators and the French media discussed 
the notion at length. Sartre’s innovation lay in turning the notion of responsibility into a 
positive, moral category. For him, individuals had a responsibility to engage with the 
present, and writers in particular had a duty to involve themselves politically, a theme he 
developed further in Qu’est-ce que la litte´rature? (Sartre, 1948), and which he would use 
as a yardstick to judge and condemn iconic French writers. 
If we emphasized the co-presence of speaker and audience, it was, ironically, the 
subsequent reporting by journalists and other literary figures that helped immortalize the 
event, as did the subsequent publication of Sartre’s lecture by the publisher Nagel 
(Sartre, 1946). We have already mentioned that several  newspaper  journalists  were 
present at the talk; they wrote about the event and commented on Sartre’s eloquence, 
contributing to the aura surrounding ‘the high priest of existentialism’. Other novelists 
would also help to cement the iconic status of Sartre and his lecture. In Boris Vian’s 
satirical novel L’E´cume des jours, for instance, the fictional and thinly veiled characters, 
Jean-Sol Partre and the Duchesse de Bovouard (de Beauvoir) are major celebrities. 
When Partre gives a public lecture, it is absolute pandemonium: rioting breaks out just 
to get into the lecture room; many use forged tickets, while others parachute in or sneak 
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in through sewers; and when Partre starts talking, there is fainting all around him, and 
deafening applause after each pronouncement. 
Leaving aside this fictional world, it was first and foremost the short book 
L’Existentialisme est un humanisme, based on the lecture, that helped canonize the event, 
and deepen Sartre’s celebrity. For all its faults (in particular, its simplicity and reduction- 
ism), this book turned out to be a bestseller, published in numerous languages, becoming, 
to Sartre’s dismay, the main channel through which a global audience became 
acquainted with his ideas. The book summed up existentialist dictums with easily diges- 
tible catch phrases and slogans such as ‘existence precedes essence’ or ‘people are forced 
to be free’, and it was peppered with accessible real-life examples (Sartre, 1946). 
In sum, Sartre’s talk ‘L’Existentialisme est un humanisme’ was central to the making 
of Sartre – to the creation of the Sartre phenomenon. It was a carefully organized public 
performance and came to be considered as ‘the cultural event’ of the autumn of 1945. 
Interestingly, its power also derived from the myriad recollections of the event, from 
ecstatic newspaper reporting and overblown literary reviews, to the booklet that was 
published from it, all in their own way helping to create the Sartre myth. 
 
Concluding comments on recent developments 
To conclude, we would like to discuss some recent developments with regard to the 
performance of public intellectuals. Some are linked to the emergence of new media, 
others are tied to an apparent (if not always actual) element of democratization in the 
relationship between intellectuals and their publics. 
The emergence and prevalence of new media have affected the nature of intellectual 
interventions in various ways, especially within the public realm. First, new technologies 
have enabled more immediate intervention by public intellectuals than was previously 
the case. Whereas traditional publishing inevitably involved successive time-lags 
between writing, publication, diffusion and reception, the new media enable a more 
instant impact. They allow intellectuals to engage directly with ongoing social and 
political events. For instance, many academics and public intellectuals provided a run- 
ning commentary through blogs and social media on the recent EU referendum in the 
UK, tracking and interpreting the events as they unfolded. Second, there is the potential 
for democratization of public intellectual life. Due to the accessibility and the interactive 
nature of the technologies involved, the distinction between intellectuals and their audi- 
ences is no longer as clear-cut as it once was. The usual gatekeepers, associated with the 
more traditional media, do not necessarily hold the same authority, or even exist, in the 
case of blogs and networking websites (Baert and Booth, 2012). Also, all participants, in 
principle at least, often have the ability to engage and interact with each other, unsettling 
old hierarchies and enabling the potential of new forms of dialogue that were previously 
impossible. Of course, hierarchies persist (in part for many of the reasons we outlined 
near the beginning of this article), and established intellectuals inevitably find it much 
easier to find web-space on prominent platforms and command a greater social media 
following, and hence get their messages across. Nevertheless, the technologies have 
certainly provided potential openings for non-established figures, savvy to the new 
mediated world. Third, new technologies reconfigure to a certain extent the ceremonial 
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aspects of traditional intellectual interventions. The new social media, for instance, 
enable a much higher degree of de-contextualization and re-contextualization, whereby 
articles, videos and posts are re-used on new platforms with new comments, unsettling 
the careful curation and control over framing that characterized more traditional media. 
In the case of publishing, intellectual interventions were in the past also occasionally 
reprinted, allowing for reframing, but new technologies vastly increase the rapidity of 
this process, as well as its frequency, whilst diminishing the influence that the intellec- 
tual holds over such processes. Furthermore, this ongoing reframing and restaging are 
central to the diffusion of intellectual interventions. In some cases, the re-use of intel- 
lectual interventions can involve de-staging, whereby they are stripped to a considerable 
extent of their ceremonial dimensions. This process can lead to de-sacralization, with 
intellectuals and their interventions losing certain aspects of their previous aura. It may 
also, however, and often simultaneously, enhance aura by expanding the reach and 
celebrity of the author and their contribution. 
Besides the new media, there are other new developments in relation to the perfor- 
mance of the public intellectual. With rising educational levels and given the dialogical 
nature of new technologies, the erstwhile hierarchical relationship between intellectuals 
and their publics has gradually been unsettled. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
public intellectuals such as Sartre and Russell tended to act as ‘authoritative public 
intellectuals’, relying on a privileged educational trajectory to speak with great moral 
authority about a wide range of social and political issues without training or expertise. 
By the 1960s, with the professionalization of the social sciences, people became less 
receptive to generalists. ‘Expert public intellectuals’ came to the surface, drawing on 
their expertise and methodology in the social sciences to intervene politically (Baert and 
Shipman, 2012: 190–4). Like authoritative public intellectuals, however, they retained a 
clear distance and hierarchical relationship vis-a`-vis their publics, justified through 
methodologies and expertise. Towards the end of the twentieth century, this hierarchical 
relationship between the intellectual and the public has been coming unstuck for a 
variety of reasons. Philosophically, the notion that we can find universal foundations 
to underscore epistemological, aesthetic or normative claims has been in decline. To the 
general public, expert knowledge is no longer seen as a neutral device; it is increasingly 
considered to be political and contestable. With higher levels of education has come an 
awareness of the fallibility of knowledge claims. One of the upshots of all this has been 
the potential for a ‘democratization’ of the public intellectual realm, whereby intellec- 
tuals engage with the public on a more equal footing, often drawing on its knowledge, 
rather than imposing their own (Baert and Shipman, 2012: 194–9). Participatory action 
research (e.g. Freire, 1970) was an earlier expression of these developments, and public 
sociology (e.g. Burawoy, 2005) offers a more recent example, cooperating with and 
relying on publics to bring about change. 
Some intellectuals still adhere to the picture of the authoritative public intellectual, 
but they do so differently from the likes of Sartre and Russell because their performances 
are imbued with irony and a level of self-consciousness that were rare in the early part of 
the twentieth century. The American pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty famously 
pointed out the significance of irony in contemporary liberal thought. According to 
Rorty, awareness of the contingency of our most firmly held beliefs must ultimately 
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lead to an ironic stance (Rorty, 1989). While irony has taken a more central role in public 
intellectual life, we believe this can be explained more forcefully by the refiguring of the 
hierarchy implied in the traditional relationship between intellectuals and their publics. 
Indeed, it is within this context of apparent democratization and to some extent the de- 
sacralization of the public intellectual sphere that ironic performances by public intel- 
lectuals, such as the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zˇ  izˇ ek, become intelligible. At one 
level, Zˇ  izˇ ek performs as a traditional authoritative public intellectual – he speaks out 
about a remarkably wide range of issues with a strong moral voice – but on another level 
his comic showmanship and in particular, alongside intellectuals such as Derrida and 
Sloterdijk, his frequent tendency to draw attention to the artificiality of his own perfor- 
mances, indicate a performed self-consciousness that was absent in the era of the author- 
itative intellectual. Brecht famously wrote that the ‘illusion created by theatre must 
always be partial, so that it can always be recognised as illusion’ (1995: 281). A new 
breed of mediatized public intellectuals appear less concerned with Coleridge’s ‘suspen- 
sion of disbelief’, or Alexander’s (2004) ‘re-fusion’ of the traditional elements of per- 
formance, and far more preoccupied instead with Brechtian attacks upon theatrical 
illusion. The question remains whether this is merely a passing phase of a few excep- 
tional figures, or whether such breaks from traditional dramaturgical rules will become a 
more permanent feature of public intellectual life. 
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Notes 
1. Alexander (2004), for instance, has offered a useful elaboration of what he sees as the six main 
elements of cultural performance: actors, audience, means of symbolic production, collective 
representations, mise-en-sce`ne, and power. In a Durkheimian fashion, he argues that under 
contemporary conditions of de-fusion, in which these elements are no longer tightly  bound 
together or assumed, actors must struggle to ‘re-fuse’ these elements in order for their perfor- 
mances to come off convincingly, and for symbolic extension to be achieved. 
2. Indeed, Clifford Geertz described Malinowski’s collected diary entries in precisely these terms: 
as a ‘backstage masterpiece of anthropology’ (1988: 75). 
3. Although we are inspired by Walter Benjamin’s notion of aura, his tends to focus on the art 
object – not so much on the creator (Benjamin, 2003). In contrast, we tend to use aura in relation 
to how both the intellectual and his or her products are perceived. 
4. The courtroom has also served as a model setting for rhetoric since its earliest elaboration by the 
Sophists. 
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